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Myopic decisions under negative
emotions correlate with altered time
perception
Shuchen Guan†, Lu Cheng†, Ying Fan and Xianchun Li*
Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics, Ministry of Education, Shanghai Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics,
School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China
Previous studies have obtained inconsistent findings about emotional influence on inter-
temporal choice (IC). In the present study, we first examined the effect of temporary
emotional priming induced by affective pictures in a trial-to-trial paradigm on IC. The
results showed that negative priming resulted in much higher percentages of trials
during which smaller-but-sooner reward (SS%) were chosen compared with positive and
neutral priming. Next, we attempted to explore the possible mechanisms underlying such
emotional effects. When participants performed a time reproduction task, mean reaction
times in negative priming condition were significantly shorter than those in the other two
emotional contexts, which indicated that negative emotional priming led to overestimation
of time. Moreover, such overestimation was negatively correlated with performance in the
IC task. In contrast, temporary changes of emotional contexts did not alter performances
in a Go/NoGo task (including commission errors and omission errors). In sum, our present
findings suggested that myopic decisions under negative emotions were associated with
altered time perception but not response inhibition.
Keywords: emotion, inter-temporal choice, time perception, response inhibition, myopic behavior
Introduction
Many decisions require trade-offs between amount of reward and time of delivery (McClure et al.,
2004), which refers to inter-temporal choice (IC). IC is widely involved in many fields, such as
finance, health, education, and so on. The subjective values of delayed reward are known to be
discounted as a function of delay time following a hyperbolic function, which is defined as inter-
temporal discounting or delay discounting (Peters, 2011). Previous studies have shown that delay
discounting can be affected by age (Green et al., 1994, 1996), cultural differences (Kim et al., 2012),
and psychological and psychiatrical disorders including substance abusers (Kirby and Petry, 2004),
patients with Parkinson’s disease (Milenkova et al., 2011) and pathological gamblers (Kraplin et al.,
2014).
In everyday life, human beings and animals continually engage in emotionally-driven behaviors
(Angrilli et al., 1997). Accumulating evidence has revealed that emotion can influence many
cognitions, including attention (Brosch and Van Bavel, 2012), sensory perception (Asutay and
Vastfjall, 2012), and memory (Rimmele et al., 2011). Several studies have already displayed that
emotional experiences (such as joy or regret) after decisions could guide subsequent choices (Brosch
et al., 2013). Moreover, emotional regulation (such as relax-focused regulation) decreased risky
behaviors (Martin and Delgado, 2011). Recent evidence has also revealed an important role of
emotional context in IC processes. Human beings often display much steeper discounting rates
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in the IC by a stable negative emotion induced by successive
presentations of negative pictures (Augustine and Larsen, 2011)
or a natural disaster (Li et al., 2011). These findings suggest that
negative context leads to near-sighted behaviors.
However, a recent study demonstrated that temporary neg-
ative (i.e., fear) priming by facial expressions in a trial-to-
trial paradigm resulted in higher percentages of larger-but-
later (LL) choices compared with neutral and positive prim-
ing (Luo et al., 2014), which indicates that negative prim-
ing makes human beings far-sighted. Such inconsistent find-
ings leave the exact interaction between emotion and IC to
be uncovered. Thus, in the present study, we first exam-
ined the influence of temporary emotional experience induced
by International Affective Picture System (IAPS) pictures by
a trial-to-trial paradigm on the IC task (Task 1). Figur-
ing out the exact interaction between emotion and IC may
help improve decision making in healthy humans as well as
patients with psychological and psychiatrical disorders due to
impaired IC in substance abusers (Kirby and Petry, 2004),
schizophrenics (Weatherly, 2012), patients with Parkinson’s dis-
ease (Milenkova et al., 2011), and pathological gamblers (Kraplin
et al., 2014).
The cognitive mechanisms underlying emotional effects on IC
are still an open question. In our present study, we made an
attempt to elucidate possible role of time perception (Task 2)
and response inhibition (Task 3) in the emotional effect on IC.
Recently, a growing body of literature has indicated that time
perception, the subjective experience of time, potentially mod-
erates IC (Takahashi, 2005; Kim and Zauberman, 2009). Patients
with depression and ADHD usually overestimate durations in
time-estimation tasks, which means they experience the feel-
ings of time slowing down (Wittmann and Paulus, 2008; Droit-
Volet, 2013). Meanwhile, they are more impulsive in IC tasks
(Takahashi et al., 2008; Demurie et al., 2013). Therefore, the
longer time perception in these patients is probably associated
with higher preference for immediate reward. Such a relation-
ship has also been obtained in normal individuals (Noulhiane
et al., 2007). Given that time perception could be altered by
emotions induced by emotional sounds (Noulhiane et al., 2007),
film (Droit-Volet et al., 2011) and facial expressions (Droit-Volet
et al., 2004), it is reasonable to propose that emotional effects on
IC could be attributed to altered time perception by emotional
context. Thus, we designed Task 2 to examine this hypothesis.
After inducing emotional states in the same way as in Task
1, we evaluated individual’s time perception in a time repro-
duction task in different emotional contexts and examined the
relationship between altered time perception and performance
on IC.
Response inhibition is an inhibitory control to restrain the
tendency to react to stimuli in a rapid and unplanned fashion
without complete processing of information. Previous evidence
has shown that cocaine-dependent patients showed much higher
impulsivities by self-report measures, meanwhile they discounted
delayed reward in a steeper rate compared with controlled ones
(Coffey et al., 2003). PGs exhibited many more impairments in
response inhibitions in a Go/NoGo task (Billieux et al., 2012)
and preferred immediate, smaller reward (Dixon et al., 2003;
Power et al., 2012; Kraplin et al., 2014). In addition, the impul-
sive individuals often discount reward more steeply than self-
controlled ones (Wittmann and Paulus, 2008). On the other
hand, a previous study revealed that there existed an inter-
action between emotion and response inhibition, for example,
commission errors were more numerous and responses were
slower in an emotional Go/NoGo task than in a non-emotional
Go/NoGo task (Schulz et al., 2007). In Task 3 of the present
study, we therefore asked participants to conduct a Go/NoGo
task under different emotional contexts and investigated whether
emotional effects on IC were related to altered response
inhibition.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-seven college students (age: 19.3  1.7 years; 20 females)
were recruited in this study, one of them quitted while performing
the task, so our data analyses were conducted on 26 partic-
ipants. All of them had never performed similar experiments
before. The study was approved by the University Committee on
Human Research Protection in East China Normal University.
An informed consent was obtained from each participant. After
the experiment, participants received monetary reward or gained
academic credits.
Affective Stimuli
The affective pictures were selected from the IAPS (Lang et al.,
2005). There were 50 pictures per type of stimuli, including
negative (i.e., fear), positive (i.e., happy), and neutral. Then, 15
participants who did not participate in the formal experiment
(age: 18.1  1.0 years; 7 males) were required to evaluate the
valence and arousal of the 150 pictures by a Likert-type scale
(Lucci, 2013) with scores ranged from 1 to 9. The more negative
the pictures are, the lower scores gained. Eighty-one stimuli (27
for each emotion valence) with the mean valence with smaller
3 (negative picture), 4.5–5.5 (neutral picture), or larger than 7
(positive picture) were used in the following formal experiment.
The numbers for negative pictures were 3301, 2800, 3350, 9007,
9412, 3550, 9940, 9429, 6022, 3266, 6313, 6263, 6550, 2750, 9500,
6370, 3530, 9911, 2799, 9040, 6212, 2717, 3230, 6311, 6415,
6520, and 6350. The numbers for neutral pictures were 5535,
7041, 7021, 7000, 7011, 7006, 7025, 7042, 7590, 2383, 2377, 7033,
7045, 7044, 7595, 7211, 7061, 7002, 7003, 7004, 1903, 2382, 2411,
7059, 7010, 7009, and 7080. The numbers for positive pictures
were 2274, 2311, 2530, 1441, 2154, 2345, 2070, 1750, 2045, 2091,
8600, 2387, 8330, 2158, 2040, 2347, 7325, 2035, 1340, 7502,
2057, 2360, 2071, 2050, 8497, 2165, and 2209. These stimuli were
presented in the same size (size: 11.9 cm  9 cm; view angle:
7º, presented in black background) at the center of a computer
screen.
Discounting Rate Estimation Procedures
This procedures were used to estimate individuals’ discounting
rate before formal experiment according to the study by Kirby
et al. (1999). Briefly, an estimate discounting rate parameter
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(k) for each participant could be made from his/her pattern of
choices across 27 questions on themonetary-choice questionnaire
whichwere randomly presented. The discounting rate was derived
by the geometric mean of two k-values when participants just
switched smaller-but-sooner (SS) gains to LL gains or the other
way. For example, a participant chose the SS gain on the trial
24 offering a choice between “¥33 today” and “¥80 in 14 days”
and chose the LL gain on the trial 27 offering a choice between
“¥31 today” and “¥85 in 7 days.” Therefore, the discounting rate
of this participant would be the geometric mean of the inter-
val between 0.10 and 0.25 (see details in Kirby et al., 1999), it
was 0.16.
Because of the magnitude effect during the delay dis-
counting task (Hayashi et al., 2013), three levels of amount
were used (Small: 2535; Medial: 5060; Large: 7585) in
present study. After obtaining the three different k values, we
adjusted the amounts of SS reward by 5% of up/down regu-
lating k values by the following hyperbolic discount function:
V = A/(1 + kD). Where V = time discounted value (i.e.,
“present value”) of a delayed amount; A = delayed amount,
D = length of delay (in days) and k = the discounting rate
(Mazur, 1987).
Experimental Procedures
Each participant had to perform an IC task, a time reproduc-
tion task and a Go/NoGo task in current study. The order of
the time reproduction task and the Go/NoGo task was coun-
terbalanced across participants. All tasks were programmed in
the E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools inc. Pittsburgh, PA,
USA).
Inter-Temporal Choice Task (Figure 1A)
Participants sat approximately 50 cm from the screen (resolution:
1280  800). They were then instructed to imagine a situation
that they actually faced and had to make a binary choice between
a SS and a LL reward based on their own experience. Each trial
started with a fixation (“+” in white on a black background;
view angle: 0.8º  0.8º) for 0.5 s. Then, one affective picture
with negative, positive or neutral valence was presented on the
screen for 1.5 s. Participants were required to comprehend the
content of the picture. After the disappearance of the affective
picture, SS and LL choices were presented at the same time.
Participants were asked to press “F” on the keyboard if they
preferred SS gains within 3 s, otherwise they should press “J”
if they preferred LL gains. After button pressing, an inter-trial
interval was followed with a random duration between 1 and
2 s (Figure 1A). The delays between two reward were constantly
1 month, which means that the SS reward were always available
immediately and the LL reward would be available a month later.
The differences between SS and LL reward were adjusted based
on individual results of discounting rate estimation procedure for
each subject (0.95k, k, and 1.05k). The valences of emotion and
SS–LL combinations were randomly presented within a whole
block. The IC task consisted of 81 trials, which included 27 condi-
tions (Amount size: small, medial, large  Differences between
SS and LL: 0.95k, k, 1.05k  Emotion: negative, neutral and
positive).
Time Reproduction Task (Figure 1B)
The task was to reproduce the duration of a standard stimu-
lus (1, 2, or 4 s) by pressing “F” on the keyboard after the
appearance of a target stimulus. Each trial started with a fix-
ation for 0.5 s followed by a randomly arranged affective pic-
ture with one of three valences for 1.5 s. The disappearance
of an affective stimulus initiated an inter-stimulus interval (ISI)
for 0.3 s which was followed by a standard stimulus (Gray
circle with visual angle of 2°) with a duration of 1, 2, or
4 s. During the presentation of the standard stimulus, partici-
pants were asked to subjectively estimate the duration of stan-
dard stimulus, which would be reproduced later. Another ISI
with one of variable durations of 0.4, 0.6, or 0.8 s proceeded.
Then, a target stimulus (Gray square with view angle of 2°)
appeared, subjects were required to reproduce the duration of
the standard stimuli and pressed “F” on the keyboard when
they thought duration of target stimulus was equal to the stan-
dard stimulus. Each participant had to finish 45 trials that con-
tained five trials for each standard duration in each emotional
condition.
Go/NoGo Task (Figure 1C)
Subjects were requested to respond to green cycles (Go stim-
uli; visual angle of 10°; frequency, 70%) by immediate but-
ton pressing, but to withhold responses to red cycles (NoGo
stimuli; visual angle of 10°; frequency, 30%). 105 Go stimuli
and 45 NoGo stimuli (35 Go stimuli and 15 NoGo stimuli for
each emotion) were randomly presented on the screen with a
duration of 400 ms. After a response, the trial was ended by
an ISI.
Data Analysis
All the responses including the choices aswell as the reaction times
of each trial were recorded by E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software
Tools inc. Pittsburgh, PA, USA) and then transferred to Excel and
SPSS 17.0 for further analyses.
In the IC task, we calculated the percentages of trials during
which SS reward were chosen (SS%) under different emotional
contexts. Then, we performed a repeated measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) to examine effects of emotions on the SS%. In
order to evaluate the effect of emotion on time perception, we first
computed the Tcorrected score by the following formula: Tcorrected
score = (Testimated–Tstandard)/Tstandard (Noulhiane et al., 2007).
This transformation provided information about both extent and
direction of the error of temporal estimation. Then we performed
a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on Tcorrected
scores among different conditions (3 emotions 3 durations). For
performance on the Go/NoGo task, the percentages of commis-
sion errors in rare stimuli (NoGo stimuli) trials and percentages
of omissions in frequent stimuli (Go stimuli) trials were analyzed
by a repeated measures analysis of variances (ANOVA).
Finally, we made an attempt to examine the role
of altered time perception induced by emotion in the
IC by Spearman’s rho bivariate analysis of correlations
between emotional effect on IC (differences of SS%
between negative/positive context and neutral context:
SS%_negative—SS%_neutral, SS%_positive—SS%_neutral)
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FIGURE 1 | The stimulus sequences and experimental design.
(A) Inter-temporal choice task. A fixation was displayed at the center of
screen, which followed by an IAPS picture for 1.5 s. Then, participants should
make their choices between a smaller-but-sooner (SS) reward and a
larger-but-later (LL) reward within 3 s by key-pressing of “F” for SS or “J”
for LL. RN represents SS reward, RL indicates LL reward. (B) Time reproduction
task: A fixation was displayed at the center of screen, which followed by an
IAPS picture for 1.5 s. After a black screen for 0.3 s, a cycle stimulus as the
standard stimulus (duration of 1,2, or 4 s) was presented which was followed by
another black screen with duration of 0.4, 0.6, or 0.8 s. Then, the square
stimulus appeared as a target, subjects were asked to press “F” in the keyboard
(e.g., “F” key) as soon as they thought the duration of target stimuli was the
same with standard stimulus. (C) Go/NoGo task: A fixation was displayed at the
center of screen, which followed by an IAPS picture for 1.5 s. Then, either Go
stimulus (e.g., green circle. Frequency, 70%) or NoGo stimulus (e.g., red circle.
Frequency, 30%) was presented with duration of 0.4 s. Participants were asked
to respond to either a Go stimulus by pressing “F” in the keyboard as soon as
possible or a NoGo stimulus by withholding their response.
and emotional effect on time perception (differences of
Tcorrected scores between negative/positive context and
neutral context: Tcorrected_negative—Tcorrected_neutral,
Tcorrected_positive—Tcorrected_neutral).
Results
The Effect of Emotion on Inter-Temporal Choice
The repeated measures analysis of variance demonstrated that
the main effect of emotion on percentages of trials during
which SS reward were chosen (SS%) was significant [Figure 2,
F(1.11,27.76) = 15.74, p < 0.001, !2partial = 0.39]. Paired
t-tests showed that compared to neutral priming, negative prim-
ing induced much higher SS% [Figure 2, t(25) = 3.86, p < 0.01]
while positive priming generated much lower SS% [Figure 2,
t(25) = 4.26, p < 0.01], and negative priming led to higher SS%
than positive priming did [Figure 2, t(25) = 3.43, p < 0.001].
These data indicated that participants preferred SS reward to
delayed reward in negative emotional context, which led to
myopic behaviors.
The Effect of Emotion on Time Perception
First, we computed the Tcorrected scores in different conditions
(duration  emotion). Then we examined differential influences
of emotion on time reproduction by the repeated measures anal-
ysis of variance. We found a significant main effect of emo-
tion [Figure 3A, F(2,50) = 3.46, p = 0.04, !2partial = 0.12] and
no main effect of duration [F(1.50,37.50) = 2.60, p > 0.05,
!2partial = 0.09]. However, there was a significant interaction
between duration and emotion [F(4,100) = 3.84, p < 0.01,
!2partial = 0.13]. Thus, we performed further repeated measures
analysis of variance and noticed an emotional effect when par-
ticipants reproduced 1-s-duration [Figure 3B, F(2,50) = 6.15,
p < 0.01, !2partial = 0.18]. Tcorrected scores were considerably
smaller in negative priming compared with neutral [Figure 3B,
t(25) = 2.75, p < 0.05, paired t-test] and positive priming
[Figure 3B, t(25) = 3.39, p < 0.01, paired t-test], no difference
was found between neutral and positive priming [Figure 3B,
t(25) = 0.43, p > 0.05, paired t-test]. There was no main
effect of emotion on Tcorrected scores when participants repro-
duced 2-s-duration [Figure 3B, F(2,50) = 0.07, p > 0.05,
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FIGURE 2 | The effect of emotion on inter-temporal choice. SS%: the
percentage of trials during which smaller-but-sooner reward were chosen.
Error bars represent the standard error of means. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01,
paired t-tests.
!2partial = 0.01] and 4-s-duration [Figure 3B, F(2,50) = 1.13,
p > 0.05, !2partial = 0.04].
All the above results suggested that negative priming made
participants judge time to be longer compared with neutral and
positive priming especially in short durations.
The Effect of Emotion on Response Inhibition
The results from a repeated measures analysis of variance indi-
cated no main effect of emotion on the commission errors
to NoGo stimuli [Figure 4A, F(2,50) = 0.78, p > 0.05,
!2partial = 0.03] and omission errors to Go stimuli [Figure 4B,
F(2,50)= 1.49, p> 0.05, !2partial = 0.06]. Therefore, response inhi-
bition measured by a Go/NoGo task was not affected by emotion
priming.
The Correlations Between Inter-Temporal Choice
and Time Perception
In order to examine the interaction between time perception and
IC in the emotional contexts, we correlated the emotional priming
effect on time perception (Tcorrected_negative–Tcorrected_neutral,
Tcorrected_positive–Tcorrected_neutral) to the emotional
priming effect on IC (SS%_negative—SS% neutral,
SS%_positive—SS%_neutral) by the spearman’s rho bivariate
analysis. The results showed that the altered time perception
by negative priming relative to neutral priming was negatively
correlated to the change of IC when participants performed
1-s reproduction task (Figure 5A, r = ( 0.45, p = 0.02), while
there was no significant correlation in positive emotional context
(Figure 5B, r =  0.35, p > 0.05). The correlation was also
absent in both 2-s reproduction task (negative: r = 0.09, p> 0.05;
positive: r= 0.15, p> 0.05) and 4-s reproduction task (negative:
r = 0.03, p > 0.05; positive: r =  0.03, p > 0.05). Therefore,
these results indicated myopic decision making induced by
negative emotional priming could be associated with altered time
perception.
Discussion
In the present study, we found that temporary negative prim-
ing induced by affective pictures in a trial-to-trial paradigm
resulted in much higher percentage of trials during which SS
reward were chosen compared with positive priming and neutral
priming. While reproducing a shorter duration of time, subjects
tended to perceive it as a much longer time in a negative emo-
tional context. In the other words, humans might overestimate
the subjective experience of time in a negative state. Moreover,
correlation analyses indicated that altered time perception was
negatively correlated with the changes of IC, while the emotional
effect did not influence performance including commission errors
and omission errors in a Go/NoGo task. Therefore, our findings
indicated that myopic decisions induced by negative emotions
could be associated with altered time perception but not response
inhibition.
Negative Emotion and Myopic Behavior
Using a trial-to-trial paradigm, we found that participants pre-
ferred SS reward to LL ones in the temporary negative context
compared with positive and neutral contexts, which indicates
that negative emotion makes people be myopic in the decision
making task. These results were consistent with previous studies
in which stable emotional contexts were induced through block
of task or whole task (Augustine and Larsen, 2011; Li et al.,
2011; Liu et al., 2013). However, Luo et al. (2014) reported that
temporally negative priming by facial expressions resulted in
much higher percentage of LL choices, which means negative
priming makes people more far-sighted (Luo et al., 2014). The
experimental procedures in our present study were pretty similar
with Luo’s study except emotional materials, the IAPS pictures
versus facial expressions. However, in our unpublished study,
we induced emotional contexts by facial expressions in the same
paradigm.We also found that negative context resulted in myopic
behaviors in the IC task, which was consistent with findings in
our present study. Taken together, we propose that people may
usually make myopic decision under negative context indepen-
dent of emotional material. In Luo et al’s study, participants
were asked to perform a facial memory task while performing
IC task, which would increase cognitive load. Growing evidence
has shown that there is significant link between cognitive load
and delay discounting. For example, Hinson et al. (2003) reported
that discounting rate was larger under higher working memory
load compared to lower working memory load. Similarly, another
study revealed significant negative correlation between memory
span and discounting rates (Shamosh et al., 2008). Therefore, we
think that different levels of cognitive load while performing IC
task might be one of the main factors resulting in the inconsis-
tent results between Luo et al’s and ours. In addition, humans
usually maximize profits when they attempt to make decisions
among alternatives. Based on earlier findings, gratitude impelled
an attempt to increase long-term gains in social networks at the
expense of short-term monetary costs (DeSteno, 2009). In this
regard, facial expressions might induce a kind of inter-personal
emotions. Positive facial expressions might led to a preference for
SS reward because SS reward can bring somepotential values, such
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FIGURE 3 | Differential emotional effects on time perception in the time reproduction task. (A) Differential effects when durations pooled together;
(B) Differential effects at different durations. Error bars represent the standard error of means. **p < 0.01 paired t-tests.
FIGURE 4 | The emotional effect on performance on the Go/NoGo task. (A) Commission errors. (B) Omission errors. Error bars represent the standard error of
means.
FIGURE 5 | The correlations between emotional effects on inter-temporal choice and time perception by Spearman’s rho bivariate analysis. (A) The
correlations in negative emotional context in 1-s reproduction task; (B) The correlations in the positive emotional context in 1-s reproduction task.
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as inter-personal network. Therefore, the different level of social
emotions induced by IAPS pictures and facial expression pictures
might also result in the inconsistent findings between Luo et al’s
and ours.
One limitation in our present study was that we did not
match the arousal in different emotional conditions. However,
the myopic decisions induced by negative emotion in our present
study could not result from the arousal level of the emotions
because we did not find a significant correlation between arousal
level of emotional pictures and SS% in the IC task (Spearman rho,
all rs< 0.3, all ps > 0.05).
Time Perception and Inter-Temporal Choice
Time perception has consistently been considered to be a cru-
cial factor in the inter-temporal decision making (Wittmann and
Paulus, 2008). Presume a person subjectively considers a duration
of time is too long, he will prefer immediate reward because
the delayed ones, though they are much larger, are not worth
waiting for. Therefore, the sense of time should theoretically
change the performance on inter-temporal decisions. A growing
body of evidence has consistently revealed an indirect relationship
between time perception and IC. A lot of mood and psychologi-
cal disorders displayed distorted subjective time perception and
impaired inter-temporal decisions. Bschor et al. (2004) found that
depressive patients tended to underestimate durations in temporal
production (35 and 90 s) and verbal estimation tasks (109 s) com-
pared with non-depressive patients (Bschor et al., 2004). However,
schizophrenia patients often displayed overestimation of time
(Lee et al., 2009; Bonnot et al., 2011; Papageorgiou et al., 2013).
Meanwhile, other evidence revealed that schizophrenic individ-
uals preferred immediate reward even with a small magnitude
(Heerey et al., 2007; Weller et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the direct
relationship between altered time perception and IC has not been
examined in previous studies.
Previous evidence has shown that negative emotional state
induced by emotional sounds (Noulhiane et al., 2007), IAPS
pictures (Gil andDroit-Volet, 2012), and facial expressions (Droit-
Volet et al., 2004; Bar-Haim et al., 2010) led to much longer
time estimations compared with neutral or positive states. In a
recent study, Buetti and Lleras (2012) demonstrated that IAPS
negative pictures were perceived as lasting longer than pos-
itive pictures when both spider-fearful participants and non-
anxious participants performed a time bisection task (Buetti and
Lleras, 2012). The negative emotion-related lengthening effect
in our present study was consistent with other findings. We
noticed that compared with positive and neutral emotional prim-
ings, negative priming resulted in much lower Tcorrected scores,
which suggests that negative priming leads to overestimation
of time, especially in the short time reproduction task. Mean-
while, SS% in negative context was much higher than that in
the other two emotional contexts. More importantly, the differ-
ences of Tcorrected scores between negative and neutral primings
in short condition were significantly correlated to the differences
of SS% between those emotional primings, while no significant
correlation was found in the positive emotional context. All
these findings strongly supported the idea that myopic decision
making behaviors induced by temporal negative priming could
be associated with the overestimation of time in the negative
context.
Interestingly, we found that the correlation between time esti-
mation and IC existed only in short duration trials (1 s) rather
than longer duration trials (2 or 4 s). In a recent study, it was found
that depressive patients were less able to discriminate between two
longer durations (>1000 ms) than control group in a time dis-
crimination task. But two groups were equally able to discriminate
shorter intervals (<300 ms; Msetfi et al., 2012). Thus, it is rea-
sonable to hypothesize that mild depression affects the ability to
maintain attention to elapsing duration but not pacemaker speed
in the internal clock model. Cumulative evidence has revealed
that the processing of sub- and supra-second durations relies on
different cognitivemechanisms. The processing of short durations
appears to be automatic, whereas long durations seem to require
not only to hold temporal information in working memory, but
also to continue to concentrate their attention on the passage of
time until the end of the stimulus (Lewis and Miall, 2003, 2006).
With regard to neural basis of time perception, dissociable neural
networks have been associated with estimation of subsecond and
suprasecond durations. The subsecond duration discrimination is
related to activation in bilateral anterior cerebellum, whereas the
suprasecond duration estimation is associated with activation in
the inferior parietal lobule (Hayashi et al., 2014). These results
support the idea that subsecond durations are processed in the
motor system,whereas supraseconddurations are processed in the
parietal cortex by utilizing the capacity of attention and working
memory to keep track of time. Moreover, a recent study showed
that activations in the medial/inferior frontal cortex and the infe-
rior parietal cortex were correlated with underestimation of time
in the time reproduction task. Meanwhile, the activations in these
regions were also associated with the less pronounced the future
perspective measured by the Zimbardo time perspective inven-
tory (Wittmann et al., 2011). In our present study, the duation
of time reproduction (<4 s) is much shorter than delay duration
(1 month) in the IC task. It is impossible to ask participants to
reproduce a longer duration (such as couple of hours, days) in the
lab. However, we could measure the subjective time perception
of a longer duration (i.e., 1 month in our study) by the Zim-
bardo time perspective inventory in the future study and explore
the interaction between time perception and IC. Participants are
usually asked tomake a number of choices between smaller imme-
diate reward and larger reward weeks, months, or years in the
future in most of typical human studies on IC. However, shorter
delay duration in the scale of second has also found in IC studies
on animals (Kim et al., 2008; Blanchard and Hayden, 2015) and
humans (Schweighofer et al., 2006; Luhmann et al., 2008). In order
tomaximize total gain, peoplewouldmake delayed reward choices
based on hyperbolic or exponential discounting in different sit-
uations. For example, humans adopted exponential discounting
when they performed in a reward decision task with temporal
constraints in the scale of second (Schweighofer et al., 2006), while
other behavioral studies in humans well favored hyperbolic dis-
counting (Kirby and Petry, 2004; Kim et al., 2012; Luo et al., 2014).
Therefore, it would be interesting to explore whether emotional
effects on IC are the same or not when participants make choices
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in the IC task in different situations in the future study, such as
in the situation of shorter (i.e., seconds) and longer (i.e., months)
pursuit time. Whatever the mechanisms are, intervention might
eventually be able to alter directly the timing system, which in
turn could profoundly affect the way individuals process delayed
reward and structure behavior toward health-promoting actions
(Wittmann and Paulus, 2008).
Response Inhibition and Inter-Temporal Choice
Impulsivity is a multidimensional concept that incorporates fail-
ure of response inhibition, rapid processing of information, nov-
elty seeking, and inability to delay gratification. Most attempts to
measure impulsivity rely on psychometric self-report trait mea-
sures, such as Barratt Impulsiveness Scale -11, Eysenck Impulsive-
ness Scale and other questionnaires. Petry (2002) demonstrated
that substance abusers displayed significant higher impulsivity
scores by Eysenck Impulsiveness Scale and discounted hypo-
thetical monetary reward at a higher rate than healthy controls.
Moreover, the Eysenck impulsivity scores were positively corre-
lated with k values (Petry, 2002). Another element of impulsiv-
ity, response inhibition is often measured by a Go/NoGo task,
which requires speedy motor responses to one type of stimuli
and inhibition of responses to another type of stimuli (Goya-
Maldonado et al., 2010). In the present study, we used a Go/NoGo
task to examine response inhibition (or motor impulsivity) in
different emotional contexts. We found that negative emotional
context lead to myopic behaviors in the IC task, while it did not
result in significant change of commission/omission errors in the
Go/NoGo task. Further, the Spearman’s rho bivariate analysis did
not show correlation between performance of Go/NoGo task and
IC in negative context (r =  0.21, p = 0.30) or positive context
(r =  0.19, p = 0.35). It seems that motor impulsivity plays
a little role in emotional effect on IC. Some other studies can
also support our explanation. For example, Coffey et al. (2011)
reported that borderline personality disorders with substance
using disorders displayed many more errors in NoGo signals
compared with matched controls, meanwhile they also displayed
higher discount rates in delay discounting tasks. Nevertheless,
there was no correlation between poor response inhibition and
impaired IC. In contrast, the self-reported impulsivity by Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale -11 was significantly correlated to delay dis-
counting task (Coffey et al., 2011). Therefore, our findings and
previous evidence suggested that impulsivity measured by differ-
ent psychological tools could have variable interactions between
impulsivity and IC. A recent study showed that the mechanisms
underlying the motor subtype of impulsivity were dissociable
from the temporal and reflection subtypes (Caswell et al., 2013).
Therefore, the exact of cognitive and neural networks underlying
different subtypes impulsivity need to be elucidated in the future.
Meanwhile, since we did not measure impulsivity using a set of
questionnaires or other tools, it is hard to illustrate whether other
kinds of impulsivities play a function in IC. Therefore, future
studies should focus onwhether other subtypes of impulsivity play
roles in the modulation of emotion in IC.
Impulsivity is multidetermined. The subconstruct of urgency
represents individual differences in the tendency to engage in ill-
considered actions when experiencing intense emotion (Cyders
and Smith, 2008). It has been correlated with striatal dopamine
release, activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (Weiland et al.,
2014) and amygdala (Cyders and Smith, 2008). Urgency scores in
schizophrenia were correlated with both reduced cortical thick-
ness in ventral prefrontal regions and reduced resting-state func-
tional connectivity (Hoptman et al., 2014). In a recent study,
Kraplin et al. (2014) reported that PGs displayedmuchhigher level
of urgency and greater discounting rate in the delay discounting
task compared to normal controls. Moreover, the discounting
rate was positively correlated with the level of urgency (Kraplin
et al., 2014). Based on these findings, urgency induced by negative
emotion could be one possibility to explain the emotional effect
on IC task in our present study. Therefore, we should measure the
multidimensional impulsivity by the UPPS impulsive behavioral
scale and explore the relationships between myopic decisions and
subconstructs of impulsivity (even the activations in certain brain
areas, such as amygdala, anterior insula, inferior/medial frontal
cortex) in the future study.
Conclusion
The temporary negative priming resulted in the preference for
SS choices in the task of IC. Such myopic behavior was probably
related to alteration of time perception by negative emotion and
not to response inhibition.
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